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THE SMALLEST SALABLE PATENT-PRACTICING UNIT 
(“SSPPU”) EXPERIMENT, GENERAL PURPOSE 







1.01 economics teach that markets work efficiently when prices reflect 
externalities.  The price system rewards producers’ activities that increase 
the welfare of other economic agents – a positive externality.  This attracts 
welfare-enhancing production to markets.  Conversely, the price system 
penalizes producers’ activities that decrease the welfare of other economic 
agents – a negative externality.  This deters investment in socially harmful 
activities.  Importantly, the Coase theorem adds that the price system will 
only properly reflect externalities if property rights are well delineated and 
there are no transactions costs (Coase, 1960).    
In the last year, some Standard-Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) active 
in wireless communications have – under the lenient eye of antitrust 
agencies – experimented new technology pricing principles which upset 
this basic economic wisdom.   One of those changes is the “SSPPU” 
experiment.   Under SSPPU pricing, the licensing rates paid (read prices) 
to owners of standard essential patents (“SEPs”) for the use of their 
technology shall reflect the “value that the functionality of the claimed 
invention or inventive feature … contributes to the value of the relevant 
functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant Implementation that 
practices the Essential Patent Claim”.   In plain English, prices charged 
for technology should reflect the value added to the smallest component 
embodying the patented invention.   
SSPPU wants to prevent upstream technology developers to claim all 
or a share of the value added to the end product sold by original 
equipment manufacturers on downstream markets. This practice, which is 
sometimes referred to as the Entire Market Value Rule (“EMVR”), has 
received wide media coverage in the smartphone industry, where royalties 
are conventionally calculated as a percentage of final handset prices so as 
to reflect the value added to end user by the patented component (say, 5% 
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of the retail price of an iPhone).  Some authors have claimed that this 
creates a problem of “royalty stacking” (Lemley and Shapiro, 2007), 
given the thousands SEPs included in a standard, and the thousand 
standards implemented in a smartphone.   An empirical study – whose 
findings have been criticized –  has found that the royalty stack represents 
a burden of $120 on a hypothetical $400 smartphone.   At the end of the 
line, royalty stacking is said to decrease innovation to the detriment of 
society at large.   
As all intuitive ideas, SSPPU pricing has some appeal.  But on second 
thoughts, its implications are so likely counterproductive that it should 
remain what it is, an experiment.  Basic economic theory, and a fictional 
example, help demonstrate this.    
 
I.  A TALE OF THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 
Take firm A and B.  A is a technology firm that develops wireless 
communications technology.  B is a vertically integrated manufacturer of 
commercial aircrafts.  A holds a portfolio patents which have been 
declared essential to an ITU standard entitled Wireless Avionics Intra-
Communications (“WAIC”).1   WAIC sets specifications for wireless 
communications between two or more points on a single aircraft. WAIC is 
primarily about safety-related applications: release of oxygen masks, 
trigger of oxygen flow, emergency lighting, cabin pressure, etc.   
Under WAIC, aircrafts manufacturers can literally cut costs.  Few 
people know that a standard Airbus A-380 embarks approximately 5700 
kilograms (kgs) of electrical wires.  With wireless technology, 
approximately 30% of the entire aircraft electrical wire (ie 1710 
kilograms) can be stripped.2  This, in turn, represents massive economies 
in fuel consumption (and lower carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions).  Given 
that fuel consumption is “probably the single most important item in 
airlines’ operating costs”, WAIC is likely to drive up the demand of 
airlines customers’ on the market for commercial aircrafts.3  
Let us attempt to calculate a crude empirical estimate of those costs 
savings.  American Airlines considers that a reduction of the mass of each 
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aircraft by 14,5 kgs yields a yearly fuel economy of $1.2 million across its 
entire fleet.4  This represents a yearly saving of $83,000 per kg eliminated 
on all aircrafts. Let us now assume that American Airlines decides to 
replace its entire fleet of 939 aircrafts with WAIC compliant ones.  With 
those aircrafts, it would make a yearly fuel economy of $141,9 million 
($83,000*1710) on the entire fleet, and an average fuel economy per 
aircraft of $151,000 ($141,9 million/939).5 If we assume that an aircraft 
has a 20 years lifespan, this amounts to total benefits of $3,02 million per 
WAIC compliant aircraft. 
With this background, let us return to our fictional example.  B 
decides to implement WAIC in next generation aircrafts.  B liaises with A 
to negotiate a license on its SEPs.  How should this license be priced 
under the SSPPU?  The SSPPU seems to preclude to take account of the 
value added to the end product, ie the aircraft.  Instead, it forces to focus 
on the added value to the smallest salable patent-practicing 
implementation.  In this case, the SSPPU is the Radio Frequency (“RF”) 
equipment, ie antennas, transmitters and receivers.6   A will thus secure 
licensing revenue that represents a fraction of the (internal) price of RF 
equipment.   That is essentially plastic, silicon and semi-conductors. 
 
II. EXTERNALITIES 
From an economic standpoint, the defect of this approach is so obvious 
that it does not deserve long critique.  A is only entitled to appropriate a 
fraction of the value created by its technology, and has no claim 
whatsoever over the value added to end users, ie the fuel efficiencies made 
by airlines.  The concept of value added to end user can also be illustrated 
with a consumer goods example, by contrasting an iPhone versus an iPod.  
Both use similar components, but one implements patented connectivity 
technology, not the other.7 And the value added to end user changes 
dramatically. 
To be sure, under the SSPPU regime, A remains in theory free to 
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3G, LTE or 4G connectivity. 
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claim from B that the value added to the smallest implementation, ie the 
RF equipment, is $3.02 million.  As was noted by the US DoJ, SSPPU 
does not prevent to raise the royalty rate (r) in order to reflect that the 
patented functionality drives demand for the end product”.8  Is this, 
however, realistic?  If we assume that the value of a RF equipment unit 
for an aircraft is $1,000, then A would have to charge r = 3020% per RF 
unit.   This would look like plain vanilla monopoly pricing, and B could 
certainly resist any such demand.  Moreover, it may again be objected that 
SSPPU does not prevent to use the end product as the royalty base (b).  In 
this variant, A could charge $3,02 million on the aircraft price.  Given 
that an A380 sells (list price) for $414,4 million, then the parties could 
settle for r = 0,72%.  Facially, this rate would stay within the confines of 
a fair and reasonable price.  However, this proposition is again 
unrealistic.9  In the SSPPU world, B can resist demands to use the aircraft 
price as the appropriate royalty base, because SSPPU imposes to focus 
licensing talks on the value added to the component, ie the RF equipment.  
If A was ever to offer a 0,72% rate on the end product, B could perfectly 
challenge this proposed methodology as inapt to reflect the added value of 
the smallest compliant implementation.  In turn, B could offer to discuss 
the price (and cost) of RF equipment as a more appropriate royalty base.  
From a practical standpoint, SSPPU thus tends to promote component 
licensing as the default rule in bilateral negotiations, and to marginalize 
the industry practice of end-product licensing.  
At a more stylized level, because SSPPU ring fences licensing talks 
around the value of the smallest salable component, it can be deemed to 
take off the negotiation table the positive production externalities enjoyed 
by other economic agents.  This interference with the price system is 
unfortunate.  Prices that do not reflect positive production externalities 
send counter-productive signals to investors, and may result in 
underinvestment.   
                                         
8 See US DoJ, Business Review Letter, 15-1 Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers, Incorporated (“IEEE”), 2 February 2015. 
9 As Geradin and Layne Farrar observe, “From a mathematical perspective, of 
course, the individual elements of a royalty payment, in isolation, are irrelevant, as one 
variable can adjust with the other. Whether we apply a 1% royalty rate to a $100 product 
price or a 10% royalty rate to a $10 value component, the per unit royalty payment will 
be $1”. However, the authors observe that this mathematical neutrality does not hold in 
the real world, due to many practical considerations.  D. Geradin and A. Layne-Farrar, 
“Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex, Multi-Patent Products”, 27 Santa 
Clara High Tech. L.J. 763 (2010). 
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This externality problem is not trivial, and certainly acute in relation to 
“general purpose” technologies (“GPT”) – better known from the public 
as “enabling technologies”.10  Bresnahan and Tratjenberg define GPTs as 
technologies that (i) are used as inputs by many downstream sectors; (ii) 
present inherent potential for technical improvements, and (iii) bring about 
innovational complementarities (Bresnahan and Tratjenberg, 1995).  
Textbook examples include the steam engine, semiconductors, computers, 
the Internet and wireless technologies.   
GPTs are quantum leaps that yield countless positive production 
externalities.  Bresnahan and Tratjenberg talk of them as the “engines of 
growth”.11  In particular, GPTs yield vertical externalities – between the 
technology and the applications sector (here, in aircraft manufacturing) – 
and horizontal ones – across sectors (here, across aircraft manufacturers 
and the aerospace industry, for instance).  Bresnahan and Tratjenberg 
further hint that market institutions (like possibly SSPPU) may, if wrongly 
designed, prevent the appropriation of those externalities, and hinder the 
development of GPTs.12 
 
III. TRANSACTION COSTS 
In the world of Coase, parties bargain over a price that reflects 
externalities, including positive production externalities.  To take a well-
known example in the economics literature, if roaming bee hives pollinate 
neighboring apple crops, then beekeepers can seek compensation from 
apple farmers through market transactions.13  However, a standard 
condition for the Coase theorem to apply, is that the “market transactions 
are costless”.14  Coase later explained that he did not believe that markets 
                                         
10 T. Bresnahan and M. Trajtenberg, “General Purpose Technologies: Engines of 
Growth”, Journal of Econometrics, 1995, vol. 65, issue 1, pages 83-108. 
11 Across the world, large public policy programmes have been adopted to promote 
research in key enabling technologies.  See Communication from the Commission, “A 
European strategy for Key Enabling Technologies – A bridge to growth and jobs”, 
Brussels, 26.6.2012 COM(2012) 341 final. 
12 E. Helpman, General Purpose Technologies and Economic Growth, Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1998. 
13 Cheung showed this empirically, by observing in the Yellow Pages that a market 
for pollination services existed in rural Washington.  S. Cheung, “The Fable of the Bees: 
An Economic Investigation”, 16 J. Law & Econ. 11 (1973).  See also, M. Muth, R. 
Rucker, W. Thurman and CT. Chuang, “The Fable of the Bees Revisited: Causes and 
Consequences of the U.S. Honey Program”, The Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 46, 
No. 2 (October 2003), pp. 479-516. 
14 R. Coase, supra. 
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with 0 transaction costs existed.  He nonetheless insisted that the price 
system worked efficiently when transactions costs are limited.  
Interestingly, SSPPU inflates by a non-trivial margin the transaction 
costs between SEP owners and implementers.  The adverse transaction 
costs effect of SSPPU can be observed at several levels.  Firstly, the value 
of the smallest salable component practicing the patent will often be 
information privy to the firm that practices the patent.  In our example, B 
is a vertically integrated aircraft manufacturer that internally produces 
avionics, including RF components.  The price of RF components is a 
transfer price unknown from A.  And even if B were to procure RF 
components on a market – for instance from subcontractor C – A is not 
party to the B-C exchange.  The cost incurred by A to figure out the value 
of the smallest salable compliant implementation under SSPPU pricing is 
therefore likely to be much higher than reliance on other observable 
metrics, including end user profits or prices.  
This problem explains why, in many patent intensive sectors, such as 
medical devices and food ingredients, the industry rule is that licensing 
contracts apportion a share of the end product profits to the patent 
owner.15   And more generally, this also explains the pervasiveness of the 
25% rule of thumb in intellectual property transactions.16   
Secondly, SSPPU itemizes licensing negotiations.  Under SSPPU 
pricing, the patent owner and the prospective licensee must agree upon the 
value brought by each patented functionality.  This means that each SEP – 
or, to be more accurate, each “Essential Patent Claim” – must receive a 
price.  As if the beekeeper and the farmer had to set a fee for the 
pollination externality discharged by each individual bee.  This again is 
likely to increase transaction costs in sectors where technology developers 
hold more than one or a few SEPs (and possibly other IP rights, including 
                                         
15 Strictly speaking, SSPPU does not prevent to spell out licensing fees in the form of 
royalties on end product price.  However, it forbids to value the technology as a function 
of the end product revenue, profits or price.   
16 Which sets that royalty represent one fourth of the profits made by the product that 
embodies the patented technology.  R. Goldscheider, J. Jarosz and C. Mulhern, “Use Of 
The 25 Per Cent Rule In Valuing IP”, Les Nouvelles, December 2002, p.123; R.  
Razgaitis, “Pricing the Intellectual Property of Early-Stage Technologies: A Primer of 
Basic Valuation Tools and Considerations”, in A. Krattiger et al, Intellectual property 
management in health and agricultural innovation: a handbook of best practices, 
Volumes 1 and 2 2007 pp. 813-860. See also, KPMG International, Profitability and 
royalty rates across industries: Some preliminary evidence, 2012. 
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ordinary patents, trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, etc.), and where 
“portfolio licensing” has become conventional practice for pragmatic 
reasons, ie essentially to avoid costly contract renegotiation when parties’ 
patent positions change over time (which is frequent, in consumer 
electronics and semiconductors).17 
Thirdly, SSPPU pricing will generate endless discussions over 
valuation benchmarks.  Let us recall the wording of the SSPPU rule:  
“value that the functionality of the claimed invention  ... contributes to the 
value of the relevant functionality of the smallest saleable Compliant 
Implementation that practices the Essential Patent Claim”.  In our 
example, the “relevant functionality of the smallest saleable compliant 
implementation” is the functionality of WAIC compliant RF equipment, 
and it can be broadly defined as inflight security communications.  In turn, 
the “functionality of the claimed invention” of A is wireless 
communications.  Thus, the inquiry shall revolve around assessing the 
added value of wireless technology to inflight security communications.   
There is not just a single way to deal with this.  One approach is to 
construe the added value as the savings achieved by B, when it transitions 
from electrical wire to RF equipment for inflight security communications.  
Those savings essentially consist in costs economies made by the 
avoidance of electrical wiring, maintenance and replacement.  But does 
this include the savings made by redesigning the factories to take 
advantage of the novel technology?18   And why not instead to gauge the 
incremental revenue achieved by B, before and after the modification of its 
production mix? Obviously, all approaches are likely to return distinct 
SSPPU valuations, and endless methodological disputes amongst the 
parties’ economic experts. 
In a 2004 paper, Posner underlined that high transaction costs are 
inherent in the licensing of intellectual property.19  This is all the more so 
in GPTs, where uncertainty, asymmetric information and time gaps are of 
the essence (Bresnahan and Tratjenberg, 1995).  With this, the SSPPU 
principle just adds another brick in the wall of transactional costs faced by 
parties to licensing negotiations. 
                                         
17 P. Grindley & D. Teece, “Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing and Cross-
Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics”, 39 California Management Review, 
Winter 1997, at 8-10. 
18 T. Bresnahan and M. Trajtenberg, supra. 
19 R. Posner, “Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property”, (2004) 4 John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law, 325. 
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CONCLUSION 
On close analyzis, SSPPU pricing is ill-thought.  It interferes with the 
efficient operation of the price system.  The proposition that licensing 
negotiations shall ignore a whole host of positive externalities is likely to 
reduce investment in socially beneficial activities, including in GPTs 
which are key drivers of economic growth.  Moreover, SSPPU pricing is 
a nest of transaction costs.  The SSPPU rule may thus limit the ability of 
technology developers and implementers to reach socially efficient 
bargains.   
The bottom-line is that SSOs (and administrative agencies) across the 
world should not advocate – let alone mandate – SSPPU in SEPs-intensive 
sectors.  This is likely to induce technology developers unwilling to 
license under SSPPU terms to desert SSOs or, even worse, to reduce their 
investments in industries where standardization is pervasive. In turn, if 
patent owners stop contributing their best technology into standardization, 
then end consumers will not obtain high quality and affordable products.  
Markets will morph into ecosystems of technological silos, where 
consumers are being locked-in without a fair price.  
Moreover, from a regulatory standpoint, the risk of under-licensing (or 
deferred licensing) due to increased transaction costs under the SSPPU 
rule may inescapably prompt compulsory licensing initiatives by 
administrative agencies.20  But as Posner rightly observes in relation to 
copyright, compulsory licensing certainly removes a transaction costs 
problem but does not imply zero valuation: “The fee that the licensee under 
a compulsory license must pay is not meant to defray the licensing costs, 
in whole or in part, but to compensate the copyright owner for the value of 
his property (more precisely, the value represented by the copyright). The 
fee thus is the equivalent of the contract price and is distinct from the 
transaction costs-the costs of making the contract which are still in this 
example zero”.21  Administrative agencies – like the US DoJ – that seem 
to support the SSPPU experiment shall thus think twice about it, unless 
they are ready to turn into price regulators and micro manage SEPs 
licensing fee. 
                                         
20 A drastic remedy which, to date, has (rightly) remained a “paper tiger”.  See Van 
Overwalle and Van Zimmeren, “A Paper Tiger? Compulsory Licenses Regimes for 
Public Health in Europe” (December 1, 2010. International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law (IIC), January 2011, SSRN 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1717974, p.37. 
21 R. Posner, supra. 
